In this piece of writing, I will critically analyze the concept of Interpretation of Statutes, where I will be referring to the famous cases viz, New York State Court’s Riggs Vs. Palmer, A.K Gopalan vs. State of Madras, Maneka Gandhi Vs. UOI. Further, I will also refer to the seminal works of pioneering jurist and sociologer Dworkin and H.L.A Hart. The objective of this work is to analyze the important stake of society whilst deciding the paramount questions pertaining to the judiciary and law.

Background of the case

The famous case of the New York State Court of Appeal of 1889 Riggs Vs. Palmer.

The grandkid of Francis Palmer, Elmer Palmer was on his will to inherit most of his money and property holding a significant value. However, he came to find that his grandfather (Francis) was considering removing him from the will. So, Elmer decided to murder his grandfather before he removes his name from the will so that he could inherit the property.

Issues of the case

During the criminal trial before New York State Court Elmer was found guilty of second-degree murder and was convicted of murdering Francis. After discovering the fact that, Elmer murdered his grandfather, the two married daughters (Riggs and Prestin) of Francis decided to sue Elmer, on the grounds that, because he murdered his grandfather, he should not get the money and property. Now, the prominent discussion is not about whether he should go to jail but whether he should get the money. However, going by the literal wording of the will, Elmer should get the money because there were no extra conditions or additives in the will.

ARGUMENTS

The arguments presented in favour of Elmer relied on the fact of strict letter of the law literally by the words of the statute that there was no alteration in the original documents, statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer. Prima facia their arguments were not wrong factually at any point. However, Justice Earl took a different approach and pointed out that there should be an underlying principle at the foundation of the legal system. That principle is “No one should profit from their own wrong” he further instated that ‘principles are just apart as important as a legal system’ in addition to that, he mentioned famous jurist Dworkin’s principles of Rational Interpretation or principle of equitable construction. in addition to that he gave practical reasoning, stating that a statute should not be read necessarily the way it is written but a subjective approach should be taken into cognizance because if we present this case to the legislature codified the law of inheritance, that a grandson murdered his grandfather to get the property against a will in his favour which was potentially nullified by his grandfather. A moderately rational legislator would defy to perceive his self-written statute in a literal sense and will support a differentiated approach while dealing with the above scenario. The famous Latin maxim ‘Aequitas est correctio legis generaliter latae qua parti deficit’ essentially declares that equity is the correction of law that has been legislated broadly in that part where it is defective.

JUDGEMENTS

The case was decided upon the majority opinion, where Justice Earl highlighted an underlying principle “No one should profit from their own wrong” and said if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all cases that arise within his manner of dale (hypothetical scenario), yet if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any men should determine his own quarrel. Or in a nutshell ‘no one should be the judge in his own cause’. The other dimension of the facets which the Honorable court duly acknowledged was that Elmer Palmer unlawfully prevented the revocation of the existing will or a new will, which further refrained Mr Francis from entertaining his rights duly bestowed by the statutes, would be to permit him to take advantage of his own wrong.

In the landmark case of A.K Gopalan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27, the Hon’ble apex court took a narrower definition of Articles 14, 19, 21 with other relevant constitutional articles while reviewing the state atrocities disposed upon famous communist leader A.K Gopalan under the guise of preventive detention, when he contested the arbitral stance of state’s prolonged detention that violated his right to life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Besides, reviewing the continuality of the preventive detention statute which confers unbridled power to the state to detain someone without furnishing any valid or rational ground before him. The major question that was argued before the court was too pellucid the question revolving around procedure established by law and due process of law. However, the court took a narrower scope of the above-mentioned articles and restricted the definition of Article 21 to mere bodily autonomy and nothing else. Further, the court acted harum-scarum whilst addressing the question of procedure established and due process question. However, the question was duly addressed later in another landmark judgement of Maneka Gandhi Vs UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597, where apex court took a broader scope of the article 21 and 19 and held that the term personal liberty should be interpreted widely but not in water tight compartments further the court refused to acknowledge that procedure established for law alongside due process of law. Henceforth, this landmark decision also paved a way towards the principle of purposive rational interpretation of the statutes.

Work of Ronald Dworkin in the field of Interpretivism

The concept of Interpretivism dwells into the nuances and intricacies of law when it passes through the institutional prism enquiring into the stakes of significant legal actions and practices of political institutions which eventually modifies statutes altering legal rights and obligations. Its core claim is that the way institutional practice affects the law is determined by certain principles explaining why the practice should have that role. Interpretation of the practice purports to identify the principles in question and thereby the normative impact of the practice on citizens’ rights and responsibilities.

Ronald Dworkin’s attack on H.L.A Hart

The prominent work Hart deals with is the system of rules, he majorly focuses his research on manifesting rules that will later act as an authentication source for recognition of laws and concerned guidelines. He further worked on a concept he calls formalism, which formulates the framework for the process of adjudication in which an adjudicator or a judge is expected to behave in a certain way or regulates the modus operandi of adjudication through curtailing the scope of prudence and discretion. It further explains the procedure of adjudication and strives to bring uniformity to a mechanical level by infusing a sense of objective framework of the legal system. The formalist approach of adjudication imbibes a dichotomic position for a judge in one sense where he has the least scope for exercising his prudence whilst deciding issues. However, on the other hand, we have extremist realism, which is also dichotomic in another sense where judges do not apply any framework or set of defined principles, they just decide cases perhaps sometimes on their biases and whims there is nothing constraining them from exercising their unbridled discretion. To address the limitations concerning to subjective discrepancy of rules which Hart duly acknowledged later in his seminal theory of open-texture, he further states that rules are necessarily open to some cases where the just implementation is disputed, he named it hard cases or penumbra, in such a situation Hart justify the dichromatic extreme realist position of judiciary and left the decision solely on the discretion of the judge. However, when the case is not in Penumbra and the stance is straightforwardly clear, in such a scenario he advocates for the formalist implementation of rules. However, in the previous case if we allow the judge as per Austin’s definition whilst dealing with hard cases and have all the requisite liberties to exercise his discretion wantonly that incident will be considered as legislation by the judiciary.

Dworkin criticised the whole theory of Hart by creating a distinction between Rules and Principles, he took the liberty of nature and enforcement whilst defining the terms. As per Dworkin Rules are standard for behaviour they apply in an all-or-nothing fashion. You either violate a rule or you do not, there is nothing subjective. Whereas, principles are applied in cases but they can be outplayed by other considerations and even when they are outplayed, they still apply which means principles have the scope to be applied or relied on subjective grounds. Unlike Rules, principles do not cease to exist when at some point not applied. Rules on the other hand taken as defeated when at any time it is not applied objectively. Dworkin criticised the stance of hard cases as they are strong discretion while amalgamating the extreme realist act with the act of legislation, he further highlighted that because the judges are not duly elected by the people, they are not supposed to legislate. In addition to that, he also pointed out that the act of legislation whilst interpreting statutes which was not pellucidly illegal when the person did the very thing constitutes an act of criminating someone retrospectively. Meanwhile, Dworkin went for a rationality check of the procedure where judges are required or free to apply extreme realist thoughts in hard cases, he ultimately concludes that there is a manifestation or a state of affair acts as an underlying principle, it is not solely based upon the of the sheer discretion of a judge to act brazenly but there is an underlying boundary of principle which acts a guiding tool. This observation undermines Hart’s assertion of strong discretion and his whole concept of adjudication, now if the principles are recognised as part of a legal system, Hart’s Rule of Recognition will cease to validate principles because it has no room for principles to be recognised.